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The Contribution of Mood and Force in the Interpretation of
Imperatives·

Chung-hye Han
University of Pennsylvania

1.

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to present a way of interpreting imperatives, where
the term IMPERATIVE refers to sentences that have distinctive imperative morphology
on the main verb. Our main proposal is that the directive illocutionary force of
imperatives is not the result of Gricean reasoning or inference, but is directly encoded
in their logical form, and that Gricean reasoning plays a role in the variability of
directive force. We define directive force as a function that takes a certain type of
proposition and turns it into a DIRECTIVE ACTION, which we in turn define as an
instruction to the hearer to update his or her PLAN SET. A plan set is a set of
propositions that specify the hearer's intentions, and it represents the state of affairs
that the hearer intends to bring about. We will show that these definitions yield
interesting linguistic results.
This paper is organized as follows. In §2, we observe that across languages
imperatives cannot be embedded and that in clauses embedded under directive verbs
many languages use subjunctives or infinitivals. We discuss the implications of this for
the proper characterization of the logical form of imperatives. In §3, we propose that
the logical form of imperatives contains two components: one component encodes directive force, and the other encodes the irrealis modality contributing the information
that the situation described by the imperative is unrealized. We also propose a way
of interpreting the two components. In §4. we suggest an extension of our proposal
for imperatives to interrogatives. In §5, we discuss how our proposal explains some
of the interpretative aspects of imperatives, in particular the interaction of directive
force and nega tion.
'1 thank Tony Kroch and Robin Clark for many v-d.!uable discu!Il!ions on this topic. 1 also thank
Tonia Bleam, Maribeal Romero, Bf'.atrice Salltorini, and A1exander Williams for helpful comments
on various versions of this paper. All errors are mine.
@1999 by Chung-hye Han
Pius Tarnanji, Masako Hirotani, and Nancy Hall (eds.), NELS 29: 97-111
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No Embedded Imperatives

All matrix sentences are associated with a canonical illocutionary force. The
canonical illocutionary force expressed by declaratives is assertive force, and the
canonical illocutionary force expressed by interrogatives is question force. But when
the same sentence is embedded, it loses its canonical force. For instance, a matrix
declarative ceases to be an assertion when embedded, as attested in (1). Similarly, a
matrix interrogative ceases to be a question whell it is embedded, as attested in (2).1

(1)

a.

b.
(2)

a.

b.

John is intelligent.
Mary thinks that .John is intelligent.
Is John intelligent?
I don't know whether John is intelligent.

A standard way of defining the semantics of declaratives and interrogatives
is by identifying their semantics with that of the corresponding embedded clause.
The main motivation for this approach is to allow a compositional semantics. Under
this view, a declarative denotes a propositi OIl which is a set of worlds in which that
proposition is true, and an interrogative denotes a set of possible answers which can
be thought of as a partition on the set of possible worlds (see Karttunen (1977), Groenendijk and Stokhof (1985)). Given this approach, the illocutionary forces expressed
in matrix contexts are explained as the result of pragmatic inference or reasoning.
Although this approach has been quite successful in the domain of interrogatives and declaratives, extending it to imperatives is not straightforward. This is
because imperatives differ from declaratives and interrogatives in that langua~es do
not seem to allow imperatives to be embedded (as noted by Sadock and Zwicky (1985)
and Palmer (1986)). Many languages use subjunctives or infinitivals in clauses embedded under directive verbs.
(3)

English
a. * I demand that give me the book.
b.
I order you to give me the book.
c.
I demand that you give me the book.

(4)

:Wodern Greek
a. * 0 Yannis se dietakse
gra.pse.
the Yannis you ordered-2sg write-2sg.hnp
'Yannis ordered you to write. '
na grapsis.
b.
0 Yannis se dietakse
the Yannis you ordered-2nd.sg NA write-2sg.Subj
'Yannis ordered you to write.'

I Sentences can also be associated with non-canonical Ulocutionary force. For instance, a declarative I am thir.ty can have the force of requesting for water, and an interrogative W7to care.? can
have tbe force of asserting that nobody cares. It seems that non-canonical force can be expressed
by embedded claUBeB. For examples, I regret to inform you that your .eroic", will no longer be
required has tbe force of firing someone, and this force is coming from tbe embedded that-clause.
Surely, non-canonical iIlocutionary force Is generated through Gricean inference. More discussion on
non-canonical iIlocutionary force will be given in §3.3.

https://scholarworks.umass.edu/nels/vol29/iss2/9
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(5)

Spanish
a. * Pido que habla-Ie.
ask that talk-2sg.Imp-her/him
'I ask that you talk to her/him.'
b.
Pido que Ie
hables.
ask that her/him talk-2sg.Subj
'I ask that you talk to her/him.'

(6)

Italian
a. * Ti ordino che fallo.
you order that do-2sg.lmp-it
'I order you to do it.'
h.
Ti ordino che 10 faccia.
you order that it do-2sg.8ubj
'I order you to do it.'

(7)

French
a. * J'exige que tu fiuis.
I-require that you finish-2sg.lmp
'I require that you finish.'
b.
J'exige que tu finisses.
I-require that you finish-2sg.Subj
'I require that you finish.'

(8)

German
a. * Hans empfiehlt, daB Du nicht zu aufdringlich sei.
Hans suggests that you not too pushy
be-2sg.Imp
'Hans suggests that you not be too pushy.'
b.
Hans empfiehlt, daB Du nicht zu aufdringlich seist.
Hans suggests that you not too pushy
be-2sg.Subj
'Hans suggests that you not be too pushy.'

The fact that languages do not have embedded imperatives and that it is
matrix clauses that express canonical illocutionary force leads us to believe that the
imperatives have an operator that encodes illocutionary force. Moreover1 we take
the fact that languages use subjunctives or infinitivals in clauses embedded under
directive verbs as an indication that the propositional type denoted by imperatives is
the same as that denoted by subjunctives or infinitivals. In effect, composing a forceindicating operator with a proposition that has the same denotation as subjunctives
or infinitivals derives an imperative interpretation.

3.

Logical Form of Imperatives

3.1.

Force in the Logical Form

Frege viewed truth as the key concept of the theory of meaning; but he was
also aware that understanding the meaning of a sentence involves more than just
Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 1999
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knowing its truth conditions (Frege (1960)). He took sentences to be complexes of
two components: a component that expresses its thought (sense), and a component
th~t expresses its force, where to know the sense of a sentence is to know under what
conditions it is true, and to know the force of a sentence is to know the conventions of
its use in discourse. According to Frege, there are linguistic expressions which serve
as force-indicators of a sentence, playing the part of an assertion sign, a question sign,
or a command si/Pl. Thus, in addition to the signs for sentential operators such as
negation and conjunction that contribute to the sense of the sentence, he proposed
that signs for force-indicating expressions are also necessary.
Lewis (1976) expresses a similar opinion. According to Lewis (1976), a sentence
should be divided into two components: the sentence radical and the mood. The
sentence radical specifies a state of affairs, and the mood determines whether the
speaker is declaring that the state of affairs holds, commanding that it hold, or
asking whether it holds. Lewis's use of the term 'mood' corresponds to our use of
'force.' Lewis represents a sentence as in (9). S is the category for sentence radicals,
and the Mood category can be instantiated by either declarative (dec), imperative
(imp) or interrogative (int). Thus, force-indicating symbols are part of the syntax of
a sentence.

(9)

Sentence

~,
S

Mood

I

{dec, imp, int}
According to Lewis, sentence radicals have truth-values as extensions, and functions
from possible worlds to truth-values as intensions. The entire apparatus of modeltheoretic semantics pertains to sentence radicals and constituents thereof. The semantics of force is something entirely different. It interacts with rules of language use
in discourse.
We believe that the facts observed in §2 indeed show that the imperative
directly encodes the information that it has directive force. We represent this information with a force-indicating operator in the logical form' of imperatives, where the
logical form is the output of syntax and the input to interpretation. Moreover, we propose that this force-indicating operator takes the propositional type of subjunctives
or infinitivals, which we represent as irrealis(p). The term irrealis is intended to
capture the fact that 5ubjlmctives and infinitivafs in general denote unreali>:ed hypothetical situations (see Stowell (1982), Portner (1992), Farkas (1991), Quer (1998)).2
We represent the logical form of imperatives as in (10).
(10)

Logical form of imperatives:
directive( irrealis(p))

In this logical form, directive corresponds to the force-indicating operator, and
irreal is(p) corresponds to the sentence radical that expresses the sense and intension of Frege and Lewis. We can say that irrealis(p) denotes a set of hypothetical
possible worlds in which p is satisfied. Further, the speaker is agnostic as to whether
'In the literature, it has been pointed out thnt not all subjunctives and infinitival. are used in
irrealis contexts, raising doubt as to tbe appropriateness of the term ilTealis to classify the proper
sitional type denoted by subjunctives and infinitivals. However, what is crucial for us is that the
proposition associated with imperatives indeed express an unrealized situation. Hence, we believe
that the term irrealis w:ill suffice for the purposes of this paper.

https://scholarworks.umass.edu/nels/vol29/iss2/9
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the real world is included in this set of possible worlds. In other words, as far as
the speaker is concerned, it is possible for the real world to be included in this set
but s/he does not know whether it is. In general, the set of possible worlds denoted
by irrealis(v) is restricted to future-oriented possible worlds due to the meaning of
directive. 1'he interpretation of directive will be discussed in §3.2.
Our proposal for the logical form of imperatives differs from the approach
that imperatives merely denote a certain type of proposition. Bolinger (1977) argues
that imperatives are a type of bare infinitival that denotes hypothetical situations.
Huntley (1984) and Davies (1986) argue that imperatives denote propositions that
specify potential situations. Wilson and Sperber (1988) argue that imperatives denote propositions that specify possible and desirable situationshwhere the situation is
either desirable to the speaker or the hearer. According to all t ese studies, the dir.ective illocutionary force expressed by imperatives is the result of pragmatic reasonmg
and inference based on discourse contexts. However, if imperatives simply denote a
certain type of proposition, the fact that they cannot be embedded remains mysterious. Further, under the pragmatic approach, it is unclear why 50 many languages
have special morphosyntactic forms for thel expression of directives. Our approach
provides a straightforward explanation for the fact that imperatives cannot be embedded: the logical form of imperatives includes an operator that expresses directive
illocutionary force, and since embedded clauses do not express canonical illocutionary
forces, imperatives cannot be embedded. Moreover, under our approach, imperatives
are grammatically specified to express directive force, whereas reasoning and inference playa role in explaining the variability of directive forces that can be expressed
by imperatives.
3.2.

Directive Force

Now we need to define what directive means in the proposed logical form for
imperatives in (lO). In effect, direL'i.ive is responsible for expressing directive force,
thereby making a sentence into a directive speech act such as commanding, ordering,
or requesting. As first articulated in detail in Austin (1962) and systematically explored in Searle (1969, 1976), sentencffi are not used just to say things, but rather
actively to do things. The action performed by uttering a sentence is called a SPEECH
ACT. We will refer to directive speech act as DlRECT1VE ACTJON.
We take the position that traditional truth-conditional semantics is not expressive enough to model the meaning of illocutionary force and the corresponding
speech act. We believe that an appropriate way of defining directive action is to use
the concept of lNSTRUCTION. We propose that by performing a directive action, the
speaker instructs the hearer to update a particular module which we call the PLAN
SET. A hearer's plan set is a set of propositions that specifies his or her intentions to
bring about a certain state of affairs. Thus, an imperative, directive(irrealis(p)), is
an instruction to the hearer to add p to his or her plan set. The notion of plan presupposes that the planner has the ability to carry out the plan. In imperatives, since
the speaker is instructing the hearer to update the plan set, the hearer is, in effect,
the planner. Hence, issuing this instruction implies that the speaker believes that the
hearer has the ability to bring about p. IT the hearer updates the plan set with p,
then the hearer intends to bring about the situation described by p. Moreover, a plan
is a future-oriented notion: if you are planning to bring about the situation described
by p, then the situation is 1I0t realized at the time that p is planned and it can be
reali7.ed in the future. Thus, it makes sense for directive to take irrealis(p) as its
argument because the future-orientation of directive is compatible with the modality
of unrealized contributed by irrealis. Further, if the speaker tells the hearer to plan
to bring about the situation described by p, the implication is that the speaker wants
the situatioll described by p to be realized.

Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 1999
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Variability in the IIlocutionary Force of Imperatives

Given our definition of directive force and directive action, an imperative
canonically expresses such directives as order, command, or request.
(11)

Order, command
a.
Stand at ease! (a commander in the army to his soldiers)
b.
Take down this poem. (a teacher to her class)
c.
Clean that mess up at once! (a mother to her child)

(12)

Request
a.
Please bring me some water.
Open the window, would you please?
b.

But imperatives can also express illocutionary forces that do not seem to
be straightforwardly directives, such as permissions, wishes, threats and dares. For
instance, in a context in which someone knocks on your door and you reply by uttering
Come in, you are not usually ordering or requesting the knocker to come in, but rather
giving him or her the permission to do so.
Sentences in general can be used to perform INDIRECT SPEECH ACTS. For
instance, although interrogatives canonically perform the speecll act of requesting
information, they can also perform the indirect speech act of requesting action. For
instance, Can you open the window? has the literal force of a question requesting information as to whether the hearer has the ability to open the window, but it can also
have an indirect force of a request to open the window. We argue that imperatives,
just like other sentence types, can also be used to perfonn indirect speech acts, and
we adopt the approach that sentences can be used this way by virtue of conversational
implicatures arising from Gricean inference in certain discourse contexts (see Gordon
and Lakoff (1971), Grice (1975), Searle (1975)). Since the description ofthe inference
process is beyond the scope of this work, here we only make some brief and informal
remarks.
In a context in which a person A has expressed the desire and intention to
perform p, the implication is that A already has p in her plan set. For instance, if A
knocks on your door, then A is expressing her desire and intention to come in. That
is, by knocking on your door, A is implying that her plan is to come in. By uttering
Come in! in this context, you are acknowledging A's plan, rather than instructing
A to update her plan set. It may be that if an imperative directive(irrealis(p)) is
uttered in a context in which it is already known that the hearer has p in the plan
set, then it performs the speech act of permission as an indirect speech act.
An imperative such as Have a nice day! expresses a wish in general. A person
does not usually have a control over having a nice day. She may have the desire and
intention ofha'l';ng a nice day, but bringing about tbis state of affairs is not completely
up to her. It will depend on events that are not always under her control. It may be
that an imperative directive(irrealis(p)) can be used to perform the speech act of
wishing as an indirect speech act if it is known that the hearer does not have control
over realizing p.
Imperatives that have the force of threats or dares express the opposite of what
they literally mean. For instance, the second imperative in the sequence Go ahead.
Hit me. Then you'll be sorry! is actually expressing that the speaker is warning the
hearer not to hit him or her. This is not specific to imperatives. Declaratives can
also express the oppOSite of their literal meaning when they are used ironically or
sarcastically. In (13), what B is actually saying is that Clinton is not smart.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/nels/vol29/iss2/9
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(13)

a.

b.

A: Clinton messed up again.
B: Yeah, he is really smart. (sarcastic)

Imperatives that express threats and dares are comparable to declaratives that express
irony and sarcasm. Just as we would not want to complicate the literal meaning of
declaratives to handle the latter, we would not want to complicate the literal meaning
of imperatives to handle the former. Instead, they should be handled by Gricean
reasoning and inference.
Extension to Interrogatives

4.

We have proposed that the imperatives have an operator which directly encodes directive force in their logical forms. If imperatives involve an operator that encodes iJlocutionary forces, other sentence types, most obviously interrogatives, should
contain a relevant operator as well, namely an operator that encodes question force.
At least in English, interrogatives in matrix contexts exhibit subject-verb inversion. whereas indirect questions in embedded contexts do not. This may be an
indication of the presence or absence of a question force-indicating operator. There
are also other facts that indicate the presence of a force-indicating operator in matrix
interrogatives. A negative yes-71O question in which both the negation and the verb
are in Co as a unit and a negative yes-no question in which the negation is lower
in the clause have different interpretational effects. The intuition is that the former
implies that the speaker is asking whether p holds, and the latter implies that the
speaker is asking whether ..,p holds. For instance, the question in (14a) asks whether
John is intelligent and the question in (14b) asks whether John is not intelligent.
(14)

a.
b.

Isn't John intelligent?
Is John not intelligent?

This fact is puzzling given any semantics of yell-no questions. since both the questions in (14) have the same truth-conditional denotation. For instance, accorcling to
Karttunen/Hamblin's semantics of questions. a question denotes a set of propositions
that constitute possible answers in a given world of evaluation. And this set is the
same for both of the questions in (14) . According to Groenendijk and Stokhof (1982) ,
a question denotes a proposition that constitutes a true exhaustive answer in a given
world of evaluation. And this proposition is the same for both of the questions in
(14). Groenendijk and Stokhof (1985) show that the semantics of questions given in
Groenendijk and Stokhof (1982) is equivalent to a partition on the set of possible
worlds where each equivalence class represents a possible answer. And both questions in (14) return the same partition where one of the equivalence class represents
an affirmative answer and the other a negative answer.3
' More formally. the denotation of ,questions in (14) translate into (Ia) according to Kartt unen (1977) . and (lb) according to Groenendljk and Stokhof (1982) .
(I)

[~(JQhnisinlelligent)7J

a.
b.

Ap [P(w) /I II' = AW' (John is intelligent)(w' ) V p =
(Karttunen semantics)

AW'~(John is

intelllgent)(w')lJ

.

AU;' [~(John is intelligent)(w) = ~(John is intelligent)(w')]
(Groellelldijk ali(I Stokhof semantics)
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If we posit the presence of an interrogative operator in Co that encodes question
force, we mav have a partial explanation as to the interpretational asymmetry between
(14a) and (i4b). We can say that even though the two questions have the same
truth-conditional denotation, they have different implications due to the difference
in the way negation and the interrogative operator interact depending on where the
negation is located with respect to the interrogative operator. That is, when negation
endfi up in Co, where the interrogative operator is, the negation interacts with the
interrogative operator to generate the interpretational effects described above. On the
other hand, when negation is lower in the clause in interrogatives, it does not interact
with the interrogative operator in Co, and 50 these interpretational effects are absent.
However, further study is required to determine the exact nature of the interaction
between negation and the interrogative operator and its effects on interpretation.
Without further argument, we assume that interrogatives have an interrogative
operator that encodes question force in their logical forms, and we define question
force in terms of the instruction concept. As in Groenendijk and Stokhof (1985), we
assume that a question 'p?' denotes a partition that represents the set of possible
allswers: namely the positive answer p and the negative answer ..,p. Given this,
simplifying matters a bit, we suggest that the question force is an instruction to the
hearer to retrieve the proposition that represents the true answer (hased on her beliefs
about the state of affairs) from the partition and plan to notify the speaker of the
proposition that has been retrieved. Thus, if p is retrieved from the partition, then
the hearer is instructed to update his or her plan set with a proposition I tell the
speaker p.

5.

Explaining Some Interpretational Aspects of Imperatives

5.1.

Issuer of the Directive

The meaning of directive force in the logical form of imperatives encodes that
it is the speaker who issues the directive. The prediction is that as a reply to au
imperative, a question as to who issued the directive should never come up. But the
felicity of the interaction in (15) seems to contradict this prediction.
(15)

a.

b.

A: Leave!
B: Who says

50?

On a closer look, what B is asking is not who issued the directive, but who is responsible for A's issuing the directive. B may also be asking whether the speaker
has the authority to issue the directive. The question in (15b) has these interpretations exactly because the imperative operator encodes that tile speaker issues the
directive. 4
5.2.

Target of the Directive

In imperatives, the speaker issues the directive to an addressee (or addrE'.~sees).
This is clearly so in cases where imperatives have overt 2nd person subjects, or empty
subjects that are understood to be 2nd person ..<\.0 apparent counterexample to this
generalization is the fact that imperatives can have 3rd person subject NPs in English.
4The original issuer of a directive expressed by an imperative may not be the speaker. For
instance, in a military context, a lieutenant can issue an order in the form of an imperative which
was originally issued by a colonel. Although the lieutenant, who is the speaker, is not the original
issuer of the order, slhe is still issuing an order by way of transmitting the colonel's order.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/nels/vol29/iss2/9
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(16)

a.
b.
c.
d.

Nobody move.
Everybody get out as quick as be/you can.
Somebody pay the bill.
The boy in the corner stand up.

However, on a closer look, as pointed out by Stockwell et aI. (1973), even in the
imperatives in (16), the subject referent is in some sense being addressed by the
speaker. Evidence that the subjects in imperatives are being addressed by the speaker
comes from examples like the following. The examples in (17) show that the subject in
the tag question must be in the 2nd person, even though the subject in the preceding
imperative is in the 3rd person. The examples in (18) show that the 3rd person
subjects of imperatives are anaphorically related to a 2nd person pronoun in the
subsequent sentences.

(17)
(18)

a.
b.

a.
b.

* The boy in the corner stand up, will he?
The boy in the comer stand up, will you?
NobodYi move. I am begging youi!*himi/*themj.
SomebodYi pay the bill. I am begging youi/*him;/*themi'

This property is captured by the proposal that the directive force encodes the information that the speaker issues the directive to the addressee.

5.3.

Future Orientation

Imperatives in general have future orientation. This can be shown by the fact
that imperatives are compatible with future oriented adverbials, but not with past
oriented adverbials.

(19)

a.
b.

Finish your homework tomorrow.
* Finish your homework yesterday.

In addition, even ad...·erbs that are not necessarily future-oriented can only be futureoriented in imperatives. For instance, now and tonight can occur in linguistic contexts
that are not future-oriented, as shown in (20). In fact, tonight can even be pastoriented, as in (20b).

(20)

a.
b.

John is eating now.
John finished his homework tonight.

But when now and tonight occur in imperatives, they can only be future-oriented. In
particular, now in (22) means something similar to from now on.

(21)

a.

b.
(22)

a.
b.

Behave yourself when the g11ests arrive tonight.
Finish your homework tonight.
Behave yourself now.
Finish your homework now.

Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 1999
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Moreover, as observed by Katz and Postal (1964), tag questions that follow
imperatives are most natural with auxiliary will, providing support for future orientation of imperatives.

(23)

a.
b.

Behave yourself, will you?
Behave yourself, won't you?

Bolinger (1977) argues that auxiliary will in tags following imperatives does not refer
to futurity, but rather to willingness, and that the tag will you is paraphrasable as
are you williTig to. Even so, if you are willing to do p, you do p in the future. Hence,
the futurity of will remains.
The future orientation of imperatives is captured by our proposal that the 10Sical form of imperatives encodes future.Qrientation. That is. in diredive(irrealis(p»),
the meaning of directive encodes future-orientation, thereby restricting the denotation of (irrealis(p)) to the set of future-oriented possible worlds.
hnperatives, however, can also refer to the present, as noted by Bolinger (1977).
(24)

a.
b.

Please, be thinking about me.
(Holding a lottery ticket, a person utters the following imperative)
Please be the right number.

Bolinger also claims that imperatives can refer to past events and provides the examples in (25) as supporting evidence.
(25)

a.
b.

Don't have three-fourths of the whiskey drunk already.
Please, do have made that call by six 0' clock.

However, these examples actually refer to the present state as indicated by the use of
present perfect. Imperatives can refer to the present when they express the speaker's
wish. The examples in (24) and (25) express the speaker's wish concerning the present,
and they can be felicitously used only if the speaker does not know whether the
situation described by the imperative has been realized or not. We have already
pointed out that imperatives can be used to express a wish as an indirect speech
act. In this case, the denotation of (irrealis(p» is not restricted to the set of futureoriented possible worlds. It can denote a set of possible worlds that describe what
the current state might be like.

5.4.

Negation and Directive Force

The directive force contributed by the imperative operator cannot be negated.
In a negative imperative, negation does not have scope over the directive force.
Rather, the directive force always has scope over the negation. We illustrate this
point in (26).
(26)

Don't go.
It is required that you not go.
;;6 It is 110t required that you go.
:=:;,
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In the logical form of imperatives that we have proposed, directive(irrealis(p»,
directive takes (irrealis(p)) as its argument. We have proposed that directive is a
function that instructs the hearer to update his or her plan set with the proposition p.
In effect, it is a non-truth-conditional operator that returns a non-truth-conditional
object. On the other hand, negation is a truth-conditional operator that operates on
a proposition and returns a proposition. Thus, it is impossible for negation to operate
on iIlocutionary forces.

According to Dummett (1973), Frege asserted that a sign for illocutionary force
cannot meaningtully occur within tlie scope of sentential operators such as negation,
but can attach only to a complete sentence as a whole. However, Dummett argues
that ilIocutionary force signs can be negated and provides as evidence what he believes
to be natural language expressions with negated iJlocutionary force. In particular,
he claims that the case is very clear in imperatives. He believes that permissive may
involves negating the force sign in imperatives. For him, if the force sign in a negative
imperative is negated, the corresponding natural language expression is a permission
sentence with the modal verb may, as represented in (27). The exclamation mark!
is a sign indicating directive force.
You may do X

(27)

= not!(you do not do X)

However, we do not believe that tws is a valid proposal. The permission sentence
You may do X is an indicative sentence with a modal verb may. Nothing compels
us to represent this sentence with a negated directive force sign. We could very well
represent it with an assertive force sign which takes scope over a permissive modal
operator. In (28), II is a sign indicating assertive force , and P is the permissive modal
operator.
(28)

You may do X

= IIP(you do X)

In rarticuIar, the equivalence in (27) crucially depends on the equivalence
between •.• <$ and P"<$, where P is a permissive modal operator, in analogy to the
equiValence between .0,<$ and 0,,<$ in modal logic. s

(29)

a.
b.

.h<$ =; p •• ¢
.0..,<$ 0 •• <$

=

H this is correct, then the equivalences in (30) should hold as well.

(30)

a.
b.

.!¢

=P..,<$

That is, my directing .<$ should be the same as my not permitting ¢, and my not
directing ,p should be the same as my permitting ....,,p. But this is dubious. Consider
the interaction in (31).
(31)

a.
b.

A: I don't want to leave yet.
B: Ok. Then, don't leave.

"For explanations Amherst,
of definitions
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In this context, the imperative Don't leave uttered by 8 does not mean the same
as I am not permitting you to leave. Rather, it means somethin~ similar to I am
permittin.g YOIl to not leave. Furthermore, t he equivalence in (30b) cannot be valid
either. For example, if I do not order you to leave, this does not mean that I am
giving you permission to not leave.
Durnmett's permission sentences involve two instances of negation: one that
negates the directive force, and another one that negates the propositional content.
We might then expect an imperative with double negation to generate a permissive
reading. Dut this does not occur. The imp erative in (32a) is a request to close the
window and the imperative in (32h) is a request to finish the cake. The permissive
readings you may close the window and you may finish your cake are not available
for the imperatives in (32).
(32)

a.

b.

Don't not close the window.
Don't not finish your cake.

Further, it is well known that an affirmative imperative can express a permission
depending on the context. Although the imperatives in (33) do not involve any
negation, they can perfectly well express permissions.
(33)

a.

Come in. (as a reply to a kno.cJ< on the door)

b.

A: Can I open the window?
[3:

Sure. Open it.

We therefore do not believe that permission sentences are natural language expressions
for negated directive force. Instead, we accept Frege's intuition that force-indicating
signs cannot be in the scope of negation.
A question arises at this point as to the scope possibility of other truthconditional operators and force-indicating operators. We conclude this subsection
with a brief discussion on this issue, limiting it for simplicity to the directive-force indicating operator. We believe that the arguments carryover to other force-indicating
operators. Let us first consider the scope possibilities of the conditional operator and
the directive force-indicating operator in conditional imperatives, as in (34).
(34)

a.

b.

Go inside if it rains.
If it rains, go inside.

For (34a), we can say that the entire sentence is a CP and the imperative operator
which encodes directive force is in Co, and the conditional clause if it rains is an
adjunct clause that is right adjoined to IP or to VP, as illustrated in (35a) and (35b).
(35)

b.

a.
CP

CP

~

~

C

C

~

~IF
Imp-Op

Imp-Op

~

IF

------=----go inside

CP

IP

~

VP

~

VP

CP

.....-------...

.c:::----.,

go inside
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For (34b), we can say that its structure is just like that of (34a), except that t~e Gonditional clause has topicalized to the left periphery of the sentence. The condItIOnal
clause then reconstructs to its original position for interpretation. This is illustrated
in (36) .

(36)

CP

a.

~C

CP

-------==----If it rains;

~
""-..

/"
Imp-Op

IP

~

IP

CP

go inside

t;

....--:::-=---.
h.

I

CP

~C

CP

~
1 rams;

~IP
Imp-Op
~

VP
~
VP
CP

....--:::-=---.

go inside

I
t;

Thus, imperative operator scopes over the entire sentence in both of the conditional
imperatives in (34).
Other truth-conditional operators that require attention are and and or. In
natural language, these operators can coordinate entire sentences (as in (37)) as well
as subconstituents of a sentence (as in (38)).
(37)

a.
b.

Eat an apple or eat an orange.
Have dinner and watch a movie.

(38)

a.
b.

Eat an apple or an orange.
Buy beer and wine.

The sentences in (38) are examples of NP coordination. For these sentences, we can
just say that the entire sentence is a CP with the imperative operator in Co. And
so the imperative operator has scope over the entire sentence. But we cannot say
the same thing for the examples in (37). In (37), two imperatives are coordinated
in each example. The verbs in each conjunct are in the imperative form. In effect,
in (37), and and or have scope over two imperatives. Given this fact, we restrict
the truth-conditional operators that cannot scope over iIlocutionary-force operators
to negation and the conditional operator.
Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 1999
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5.5.
Speaker's Belief in the Realization of the Situation Described by
the Proposition

The speaker of an imperative believes that the state of affairs described by the
proposition it expr.·· ses is realizable. Hence, it is infelicitous to follow an imperative
with a sentence that expresses the speaker's belief that the situation described by the
proposition of the imperative will not be realized.
. (39)

# Eat this fish! But you won't.

Moreover, imperatives with individual-level stative predicates are infelicitous because
the states of affairs described by individual-level statives are not something that can
be realized unless they have already been reali:zed. 6
(40)

a.
b.

# Be tall.
# Have blue eyes.

This property is captured by our proposal that the directive force entails the information that the speaker believes that the addressee hils the ability to bring about the
state of affairs described.
6.

Conclusion

In this paper, we have proposed a way of interpreting imperatives. We have
argued that the logical form of imperatives includes two components: one that encodes directive illocutionary force and another that encodes the irrealis modality that
contributes the information that the situation described by the imperative is unrealized. We defined the component that encodes directive force as a function that takes
a proposition that denotes a set of hypothetical possible worlds and turns it into a
directive action. We defined a directive action in turn as an instruction to the hearer
to update a plan set with a proposition. According to our analysis, the directive force
of imperatives is not the result of Gricean inference, but is directly encoded in their
logical forms, and Gricean inference plays a role only in explaining the variability of
directive force of imperatives.
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